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Abstract
We analyze the implications of transboundary pollution externalities on environmental policymaking in
a spatial and finite time horizon setting. We focus on a simple regional optimal pollution control problem
in order to compare the global and local solutions in which, respectively, the transboundary externality is
and is not taken into account in the determination of the optimal policy by individual local policymakers.
We show that the local solution is suboptimal and as such a global approach to environmental problems
is effectively needed. Our conclusions hold true in different frameworks, including situations in which the
spatial domain is either bounded or unbounded, and situations in which macroeconomic-environmental
feedback effects are taken into account. We also show that if every local economy implements an environ-
mental policy stringent enough, then the global average level of pollution will fall. If this is the case, over
the long run the entire global economy will be able to achieve a completely pollution-free status.
Keywords: Diffusion, Pollution Control, Spatial Dynamics
JEL Classification: C60, H23, Q28
1 Introduction
After decades of debates it has finally grown a shared consensus on the fact that anthropogenetic activ-
ities, and in particular economic activities, are an important determinant of environmental problems and
climate change (Oreskes, 2004, IPCC, 2014). Policymakers need thus to critically intervene to reduce the
accumulation of polluting emissions in the atmosphere in order to ensure that economic development is
effectively addressed towards a sustainable path. However, understanding how to determine the optimal
size of these policy interventions is not simple at all, especially because the stock of pollution in specific
locations is strongly affected by the level of emissions generated in other locations as well, a phenomenon
referred to as transboundary externality (Ansuategi and Perrings, 2000; Ansuategi, 2003). In order to ensure
that such externalities are effectively accounted for in the design of environmental policy it has often been
suggested that local policymakers should adopt a global perspective and collaborate with one another. This
argument has been summarized in the popular motto “think globally, act locally”1 (or “think global, act
local”). Despite the fact that the benefits of such a collaborative approach to policymaking are quite clear,
understanding how to effectively implement collaboration is not simple at all, since quantifying the size of
such transboundary externalities and what individual policymakers should do is all but trivial. The goal of
this paper is to partly contribute to this debate by formally analyzing the desirability of a think globally, act
locally approach and the type of intervention that local policymakers should opt for in order to effectively
implement it.
∗SKEMA Business School - Universite´ Coˆte d’Azur, Sophia Antipolis Campus, France. Contact: davide.latorre@skema.edu.
†University of Cagliari, Department of Economics and Business, Cagliari, Italy. Contact: danilo.liuzzi@unica.it.
‡University of Pisa, Department of Economics and Management, via Cosimo Ridolfi 10, Pisa 56124, Italy. Contact: si-
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1The motto “think globally, act locally” seems to have origins in the pioneering work of the Scottish urban planner Geedes
(1915) which, even if not explicitly containing the phrase, clearly discusses the underlying argument.
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Specifically, we analyze a pollution control problem in presence of transboundary externalities. On the
one hand, several works have discussed different types of pollution control problems (Bawa, 1975; Forster,
1972, 1975; Keeler et al., 1973; van der Ploeg and Withagen, 1991; Athanassoglou and Xepapadeas, 2012;
Saltari and Travaglini, 2014; La Torre et al., 2017), but to the best of our knowledge, none has ever considered
the effects of transboundary externalities. On the other hand, several works have introduced transboundary
externalities in the form of spatial spillovers in the contexts of capital accumulation (Brito, 2004; Camacho
and Zou, 2004; Camacho et al., 2008; Boucekkine et al., 2009; 2013a, 2013b) and environmental problems
(Brock and Xepapadeas, 2008, 2010; Camacho and Pe´rez–Barahona, 2015; La Torre et al., 2015, 2019a,
2019b), but none in a pollution control framework. We therefore try to bridge these two branches of the
economics literature by analyzing a finite horizon framework in which the social planner tries to minimize
the social costs of pollution (La Torre et al., 2017) by accounting for the fact that polluting emissions,
independently of where they are originated, naturally spread in the atmosphere affecting the pollution
stock of every location (La Torre et al., 2015). Such a setting allows us to compare the “global” and
“local” solutions in which, respectively, the transboundary externality is and is not taken into account in
the determination of the optimal environmental policy by single local policymakers. This approach gives
rise to a simple “regional optimal control problem”, which is a specific type of spatially-structured optimal
control problem aiming to understand whether the local solution is effectively optimal also globally (Lions,
1973, 1988). This class of problem was born as an application of the think globally, act locally motto in
mathematics, thus our paper partly relates to this literature as well (see Anita and Capasso, 2018, for a
recent survey of applications in epidemiology). To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first paper bringing
a regional optimal control approach in economics.
The analysis of our simple regional optimal control problem, and its peculiar quadratic-linear formulation,
allows us to analytically derive two interesting conclusions. First, we show that whenever some heterogeneity
in the initial spatial distribution of pollution exists (which seems to be the most relevant scenario from a
real-world perspective), the local solution is suboptimal and as such a global approach to environmental
problems is desirable, consistently with the think globally, act locally motto. Second, we quantify the
amount of collaboration that is needed at local level in order to achieve globally desirable goals. Specifically,
we show that if every local economy implements an environmental policy stringent enough (and we determine
what stringent enough exactly means), then the global average pollution level will fall. If this is the case,
then over the long run the entire global economy will be able to achieve a completely pollution-free status.
These two results jointly suggest that from a normative perspective it may well be possible to determine how
global collaboration could be implemented locally in order to deal with common pollution problems. To the
best of our knowledge such a neat and clear characterization of these issues from an economic point of view
has never been provided before. We also show that our main conclusions do not depend on the peculiarity
of our model but they rather extend to more general and complicated frameworks.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses environmental policy in a local setting, where there
are no transboundary externalities. This represents a benchmark for our following analysis, and it basically
consists of an a-spatial pollution control problem over finite horizon, in which the stock of pollution is entirely
determined by local economic conditions. We derive the optimal policy which characterizes the environmen-
tal tax in a setting in which local policymakers independently determine their level of intervention. Section
3 extends our baseline model in order to allow for a spatial dimension in which transboundary externalities
occur as a result of spatial pollution diffusion over a bounded spatial domain. We derive the optimal policy
which characterizes how the environmental tax is determined at a global level as a coordinated decision of
local policymakers. We show that, in the most interesting situations in which some initial spatial hetero-
geneity exists, the localized approach to environmental policy gives rise to suboptimal solutions, suggesting
that coordination across local policymakers is essential to deal with environmental problems. We also quan-
tify the minimal level of intervention needed at local level allowing the global average level of pollution to
decrease over time, and we show that if such a minimal level of intervention is implemented in every local
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economy then over the long run the entire global economy will be able to achieve a completely pollution-free
status. The specific linear-quadratic formulation of our model allows us to derive the explicit solution for
the spatio-temporal dynamic path of the environmental tax and the pollution level, which we illustrate
through a numerical example to clearly visualize the extent to which the local and global solutions may
differ. Section 4 presents some extensions of our baseline model showing that our main results straightfor-
wardly apply also in more general frameworks, including traditional macroeconomic-environmental settings
with economy-environment feedbacks. Section 5 presents a further extension of our baseline model in which
the spatial domain is unbounded showing that also in such a setting our main conclusions apply. Also in
such a framework we derive the explicit solution for the spatio-temporal dynamic path of the environmental
tax and the pollution level. Section 6 as usual concludes and suggests directions for future research. The
proofs of most of our results are presented in appendix A.
2 The A-Spatial Model
We consider a deterministic version of the finite time horizon pollution control problem recently presented
in La Torre et al. (2017). Agents consume entirely their disposable income, ct = (1 − τt)yt, where ct is
consumption, yt income and τt ∈ (0, 1) the tax rate. The final consumption good, yt, is produced through a
linear production function, yt = akt, where a > 0 is a technological parameter and kt capital. Capital grows
at a constant exogenous rate (normalized to unity), and productive activities generate pollution, pt. The
tax revenue is entirely allocated to environmental policy aiming to reduce pollution accumulation, and one
unit of output devoted to environmental preservation reduces one unit of pollution. Pollution dynamics is
summarized by the following equation p˙t = [η(1− τt)− δ] pt, where η > 0 is the rate at which output growth
generates emissions and δ > 0 the natural pollution decay rate. In this setting, the policy instrument
τt represents the environmental tax aiming to manage the economic-environmental trade off. The social
planner wishes to minimize the social cost of pollution by choosing the optimal level of the tax rate. The
social cost function, C, is the weighted sum of two terms: the expected discounted (ρ > 0 is the discount
factor) sum of instantaneous social losses depending on both environmental and economic factors, and the
discounted environmental damage associated with the level of pollution remaining at the end of the planning
horizon, T . Both the loss function c(pt, τt) and the damage function d(pT ) are assumed to take a quadratic
form as follows: c(pt, τt) =
p2t (1+τ
2
t )
2 and d(pT ) =
p2T
2 , respectively. The weight of the social losses and the
environmental damage are given by θ ∈ [0, 1] and 1 − θ, respectively, such that 1−θθ represents the relative
weight of the environmental damage in terms of the social losses.
Therefore, the social planner needs to choose the level of the environmental tax in order to minimize the
social cost, given the evolution of pollution and its initial condition. The planner’s optimal control problem
reads as follows:
min
τt
C =
∫ T
0
p2t (1 + τ
2
t )
2
e−ρtdt+
1− θ
θ
p2T
2
e−ρT (1)
s.t. p˙t = [η(1− τt)− δ] pt (2)
p0 > 0 given, (3)
Note that the objective function in the above problem reflects sustainability considerations related to in-
tertemporal equity (Chichilnisky et al., 1995; Chichilnisky, 1997; Colapinto et al., 2017). In particular, it is
consistent with the so-called Chichilnisky’s criterion which proposes to consider a weighted average between
the discounted sum of instantaneous costs and the long run cost associated with pollution in order to make
sure that future generations’ wellbeing is effectively taken into account in the determination of the current
optimal policy (Chichilnisky, 1997). The larger 1 − θ (i.e., the lower θ) the larger the weight attached to
future generations, suggesting, as we shall clarify later, that environmental policy will tend to be stricter
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in order to allow future generations to live in a cleaner environment; thus 1 − θ represents the degree of
sustainability concern (La Torre et al., 2017).
In order to simplify the above problem, we can define ut = ptτt which allows us to obtain a linear-
quadratic model’s formulation which can be explicitly solved in closed form. Through this variable change,
the above problem can be rewritten as follows:
min
ut
C =
∫ T
0
p2t + u
2
t
2
e−ρtdt+
1− θ
θ
p2T
2
e−ρT (4)
s.t. p˙t = (η − δ) pt − ηut (5)
p0 > 0 given, (6)
The current value Hamiltonian function, H(pt, ut, λt), read as:
H = p
2
t + u
2
t
2
+ λt [(η − δ)pt − ηut] ,
where λt is the costate variable. The FOCs for a minimum are given by the following expressions:
λ˙t = ρλt − pt − (η − δ)λt (7)
ut = ηλt. (8)
Substituting the latter expression in the former allows us to obtain the following system of differential
equations for the state and control variables:
u˙t = (ρ− η + δ)ut − ηpt (9)
p˙t = (η − δ) pt − ηut, (10)
which, jointly with the terminal condition uT = η
1−θ
θ pT , completely characterize the optimal solution of our
a-spatial control problem. By defining the following vector zt and matrix Θ:
zt =
[
pt
ut
]
, Θ =
[
η − δ −η
−η ρ− η + δ
]
the system (9) and (10) can be rewritten as as follows:
z˙t = Θzt
whose solution is given by:
zt = Ce
Θt,
where C = [C1, C2]
T . Since the two eigenvalues are both real and distinct, it is not complicated to calculate
the exponential term eΘt as follows:
eΘt =

1
2 e
1
2
ρ t
(
cosh
(
1
2 ξ t
)− (2(δ−η)+ρ) sinh( 12 ξ t)ξ ) − e 12 ρ t sinh( 12 ξ t)ηξ
− e
1
2 ρ t sinh( 12 ξ t)η
ξ
1
2 e
1
2
ρ t
(
cosh
(
1
2 ξ t
)
+
(2(δ−η)+ρ) sinh( 12 ξ t)
ξ
)
 (11)
where ξ =
√
[2(δ − η) + ρ]2 + 4η2. The explicit solution of the system above is therefore given by the
following expressions:
u∗t =
η
(
(1− θ) ξ − {(1− θ) [2(δ − η) + ρ]− 2 θ} tanh [12 ξ (T − t)]) p0
e
1
2
ρ T
{
θ ξ + θ [2(δ − η) + ρ] + 2 η2 (1− θ) tanh (12 ξ T )} (12)
p∗t =
{
θ [2(δ − η) + ρ] + 2 η2 (1− θ) tanh [12 ξ (T − t)]+ θ ξ} p0
e
1
2
ρ T
{
θ ξ + θ [2(δ − η) + ρ] + 2 η2 (1− θ) tanh (12 ξ T )} , (13)
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from which it follows that the optimal environmental tax rate, τt =
ut
pt
, read as follows:
τ∗t =
η
(
(1− θ) ξ − {(1− θ) [2(δ − η) + ρ]− 2 θ} tanh [12 ξ (T − t)])
θ [2(δ − η) + ρ] + 2 η2 (1− θ) tanh [12 ξ (T − t)]+ θ ξ (14)
This expression can be rewritten as in La Torre et al. (2017) as follows:
τt =
1
2η
{
2(η − δ)− ρ+
√
[2(η − δ)− ρ]2 + 4η2 tanh
[√
[2(η − δ)− ρ]2 + 4η2(T − t)
2
+
+ arctanh
(
2(1− θ)η2 − 2(η − δ)θ + ρθ
θ
√
[2(η − δ)− ρ]2 + 4η2
)]}
(15)
where tanh(z) = e
z−e−z
ez+e−z and arctanh(z) =
log(1+z)−log(1−z)
2 , with −1 < z < 1, are the hyperbolic tangent
function and its inverse, respectively. From the (14) we can note that the optimal environmental tax is
time-varying and intuitively increases with the degree of sustainability concern, and similarly also the op-
timal pollution level changes over time to reflect the environmental tax dynamics. Moreover, the optimal
environmental tax is completely independent of the initial pollution level p0, suggesting that the only de-
terminants of the optimal policy are environmental (η and δ) and economic (ρ, θ, T ) parameters. Note
that in the determination of the above optimal policy the social planner takes into account only the specific
characteristics of the local economy, meaning that the pair (τ∗t , p∗t ) in (14) and (13) characterizes the local
solution in which local policymakers independently determine their level of policy intervention.
3 The Spatial Model: Bounded Spatial Domain
We now introduce a spatial dimension in the above problem to allow pollution to diffuse across space. We
assume that the economy develops along a linear city (Hotelling, 1929), where all activities take place,
and in particular pollution, even if generated in a specific location, diffuses across the whole economy (La
Torre et al., 2015). We denote with τx,t and px,t the tax rate and the pollution stock in the position x at
date t, in a compact interval [xa, xb] ⊂ R. We also assume that the economy is isolated, in the sense that
there is no flow of pollution that can cross the boundary in the normal direction and the component on
the boundary is purely tangential. Mathematically this is described by the so-called Neumann’s conditions,
which state that the normal derivatives at x = {xa, xb} are null: ∂τx,t∂x = ∂px,t∂x = 0. Other constraints,
such us Dirichlet or Robin boundary conditions, might be imposed as well, however these conditions will
somehow force the pollution level to assume a specific value at the boundary and thus to follow a specific
path over time, which do not seem to fit the purpose of this paper which rather aims at exploring the
pollution dynamics in a closed economy without external impositions. In this framework, any position x
may be interpreted as a specific local economy while the entire spatial domain as the global economy; such
a possibility to distinguish between local and global economies allows us to compare the local and global
solutions of the pollution control problem. Modeling the spatial domain as a compact interval implies that
we are considering an isolated global economy (i.e., an island country located far away from other countries)
in which pollution is entirely determined by the behavior of the different local economies which compose it
(i.e., the subnational unities within the country). Despite this may seem a very restrictive assumption, as
we shall see in section 5, our main results will not depend on the boundedness of the spatial domain. In this
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setting, the spatial control model can be summarized by the following problem:
min
τx,t
C =
∫ T
0
∫ xb
xa
p2x,t(1 + τ
2
x,t)
2
e−ρtdxdt+
1− θ
θ
∫ xb
xa
p2x,T
2
e−ρTdx (16)
s.t.
∂px,t
∂t
= d
∂2px,t
∂x2
+ [η(1− τx,t)− δ] px,t (17)
∂τx,t
∂x
=
∂px,t
∂x
= 0, x ∈ {xa, xb}, (18)
px,0 > 0 given (19)
With respect to the a-spatial control problem discussed in the previous section, two important differences
arise. (i) The social planner wishes to minimize the social costs of pollution within the global economy
(i.e., over the entire spatial domain), thus the optimal policy determined in this framework characterizes
the global solution which policymakers collaborating with one another would agreed upon, or which a
global intergovernmental policymaker would determine and impose to local policymakers. (ii) The dynamics
of pollution is described by a partial differential equation (PDE) which characterizes its spatio-temporal
evolution, and the parameter d ≥ 0 represents the diffusion coefficient which measures the speed at which
the pollution stock spreads across space. Therefore, the term d
∂2px,t
∂x2
in (17) introduces some transboundary
pollution externalities since the increase in the stock of pollution in each local economy x is affected by the
stock of pollution in other local economies x′ 6= x as well. These two substantive differences with respect to
the a-spatial model imply that the environmental outcomes in different local economies are all interrelated
and fully accounted for in the determination of the global optimal policy; this intuitively suggests, as we
shall prove later, that, generally speaking, a global approach to environmental policy is superior to a local
approach.
As in our previous a-spatial analysis, we simplify the problem by defining a new control variable ux,t =
px,tτx,t. Under this variable change, our problem reads as follows:
min
τx,t
C =
∫ T
0
∫ xb
xa
p2x,t + u
2
x,t
2
e−ρtdxdt+
1− θ
θ
∫ xb
xa
p2x,T
2
e−ρTdx (20)
s.t.
∂px,t
∂t
= d
∂2px,t
∂x2
+ (η − δ) px,t − ηux,t (21)
∂ux,t
∂x
=
∂px,t
∂x
= 0, x ∈ {xa, xb}, (22)
px,0 > 0 given. (23)
Before deriving the global solution determined by solving the problem (20) – (23), it may be useful to
discuss the local solution. In the local solution, local policymakers do not internalize the transboundary
pollution externality and thus the environmental tax is determined as in the previous section (14); however,
differently from the previous section in which we have abstracted entirely from spatial considerations, because
of such a transboundary externality, the level of pollution in each local economy strictly depends on the
level of pollution in other local economies as well. Therefore, the local solution is given by the pair (ux,t,
px,t) where:
ux,t = τ
∗
t px,t (24)
and px,t is the solution of the following partial differential equation:
∂px,t
∂t
= d
∂2px,t
∂x2
+ (η − δ) px,t − ηux,t, (25)
and τ∗t is given in (14). Therefore, in the local solution the environmental tax is set without considering any
spatial interaction between local economies but pollution is transboundary because of spatial diffusion.
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Moving now to the global solution, we approach the spatial optimal control problem (20) – (23) by
following a variational method (Troltzsch, 2010; Boucekkine et al., 2013a). The generalized current value
Hamiltonian function, H(px,t, ux,t, λx,t), reads as follows:
H = p
2
x,t + u
2
x,t
2
+ λx,t
[
d
∂2px,t
∂x2
+ (η − δ)px,t − ηux,t
]
where λx,t is the costate variable. The FOCs for a minimum are given by the following expressions:
∂λx,t
∂t
= ρλx,t − d∂
2λx,t
∂x2
− px,t − (η − δ)λx,t (26)
ux,t = ηλx,t (27)
Rearranging this last expression in terms of λx,t and substituting this into (21) and (26) we obtain the
following system of PDEs:
∂px,t
∂t
= d
∂2px,t
∂x2
+ (η − δ) px,t − ηux,t (28)
∂ux,t
∂t
= ρux,t − d∂
2ux,t
∂x2
− ηpx,t − (η − δ)ux,t, (29)
which, jointly with the following boundary conditions:
px,0 = p0(x) (30)
ux,T = η
1− θ
θ
px,T (31)
∂pxa,t
∂x
=
∂pxb,t
∂x
= 0 ∀t ∈ [0, T ] (32)
∂τxa,t
∂x
=
∂τxb,t
∂x
= 0 ∀t ∈ [0, T ], (33)
completely characterize the optimal solution of our spatial control problem. The analysis of the optimality
conditions above allows us to derive some interesting results about the eventual differences between the local
and global approaches to policymaking. These are summarized in the following Propositions 1 and 2.
Proposition 1. Assume that p0(x) = p0 along with ux,t = ux,t and px,t = px,t as in (24) and (25),
respectively. Then the pair (ux,t, px,t) represents the optimal solution of the control problem (20) – (23).
Proposition 2. Assume that p0(x) 6= p0 along with ux,t = ux,t and px,t = px,t as in (24) and (25). Then
the pair (ux,t, px,t) does not represent the optimal solution of the control problem (20) – (23).
Proposition 1 states that in a framework in which there is no spatial heterogeneity in the initial pollution
distribution, then the local approach to policymaking is optimal also from a global perspective, since the
global solution coincides with the local solution discussed in the previous section. Proposition 2 states that,
whenever there exists some spatial heterogeneity in the initial pollution distribution, the local approach to
policymaking is suboptimal from a global perspective, since the local solution does not solve the spatial
control problem above. These results are quite intuitive: in the absence of heterogeneity transboundary
pollution externalities do not play any role, and thus local policymakers can safely determine their optimal
intervention levels without taking into account what is happening in the surrounding local economies. In the
presence of heterogeneity transboundary pollution externalities become critical and therefore determining
local policies without accounting for them will lead to suboptimal results globally. Clearly, from a real world
perspective, the existence of initial spatial heterogeneity is the most interesting and realistic situation since
different local economies are characterized by idiosyncratic economic and environmental features which have
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determined their economic history impacting on their specific initial pollution levels.2 In such a scenario
Proposition 2 provides strong support for the think globally, act locally argument.
From our above discussion, it is clear that in the most realistic situations policy coordination across
local economies is essential in order to deal with environmental problems. However, understanding how to
implement coordination is not simple since it is not straightforward to quantify what the intervention of
single local economies should be. We will now try to shed some light on this by analyzing the patterns of the
pollution and the environmental tax dynamics in a framework with heterogeneous initial spatial pollution
distribution. It is then possible to prove the following results, summarized by Propositions 3, 4 and 5.
Proposition 3. Let (ux,t, px,t) ≥ 0 be the globally optimal solution of the spatial optimal control problem (28)
– (33) with initial pollution level given by p0(x), along with ux,t = px,tτx,t and τmin = min(x,t)∈[xa,xb]×[0,T ] τx,t.
Define the global average of pollution at the time t ∈ [0, T ] as follows:
ptott =
∫ xb
xa
px,tdx. (34)
If τmin >
η−δ
η , then p
tot
t will be non-increasing over time.
Proposition 4. Let (ux,t, px,t) ≥ 0 be the globally optimal solution of the spatial optimal control problem
(16) – (19) with initial pollution level given by p0(x). Let ux,t = px,tτx,t and τmin = min(x,t)∈[xa,xb]×[0,T ] τx,t;
then px,t ≤ e(η−δ−ητmin)thx,t where hx,t is the solution of the following problem:
∂hx,t
∂t
= d
∂2hx,t
∂x2
on (xa, xb)× (0, T ) (35)
∂hxa,t
∂x
=
∂hxb,t
∂x
= 0 ∀t ∈ [0, T ] (36)
hx,0 = p0(x) in (xa, xb) (37)
Proposition 5. If τmin >
η−δ
η then limT→+∞ px,T = 0 for any x ∈ [xa, xb].
Proposition 3 identifies a lower bound for the environmental tax in any local economy allowing to achieve
a reduction in the global average pollution level. If each local economy implements at any moment in time
an environmental policy stringent enough (τx,t >
η−δ
η , ∀x, t) then it will be possible to effectively observe a
pollution reduction in the global economy. This result can be interpreted from a normative perspective to
determine the minimal policy that needs to be implemented locally. Proposition 4 states that, independently
of what single local economies do, the minimum of the tax rate in different local economies at different
moments in time, τmin, allows to determine an upper bound for the pollution stock at global level. Therefore,
the lowest tax rate implemented by single local economies provides us with important information about the
maximal pollution level that the global economy will need to bear. Proposition 5 states that if the minimum
of the tax is large enough (i.e., τmin >
η−δ
η ) then it will be possible for the global economy to achieve a
completely pollution-free status in the long run. The lowest tax rate implemented by single local economies
can thus be informative also of whether the pollution problem can be effectively eliminated in the long run.
These three propositions jointly allow us not only to clearly understand that some collaboration across local
economies is needed, but also to quantify the minimal level of policy intervention required to achieve the
desirable global goal of pollution elimination.
3.1 An Analytical Solution
Our results thus far have been derived by focusing on the FOCs for our optimization problem. However,
because the model (20) – (23) has a linear-quadratic structure, it is possible to solve it in closed form to
2This is consistent with the path-dependency argument frequently discussed in the economic geography literature resulting
from agglomeration and external economies (Krugman, 1991; Fujita et al., 1999; Fujita and Thisse, 2002).
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gain some further understanding on the difference between the local and the global solutions. This result is
summarized in the next two propositions.
Proposition 6. The locally optimal pair (px,t, ux,t) is given by[
px,t
ux,t
]
=
[
e
∫ t
0 η−δ−ητ∗s ds
[
A0
2 +
∑
n≥1An cos
(
2npi
[
x−xa
xb−xa
])]
τ∗t px,t
]
(38)
where
A0 =
2
xb − xa
∫ xb
xa
p0(x)dx, An =
2
xb − xa
∫ xb
xa
p0(x) cos
(
2npi
[
x− xa
xb − xa
])
dx
and τ∗t is given by (14).
Proposition 7. The globally optimal pair (px,t, ux,t) is given by[
px,t
ux,t
]
= eΘt
 A02 +∑n≥1Ane−d
(
2npi
xb−xa
)2
t
cos
(
2npi
[
x−xa
xb−xa
])
B0
2 +
∑
n≥1Bne
−d
(
2npi
xb−xa
)2
(T−t)
cos
(
2npi
[
x−xa
xb−xa
])
 (39)
where
eΘt =

1
2 e
ρt
2
(
cosh
(
ξt
2
)
− (2(δ−η)+ρ) sinh(
ξt
2 )
ξ
)
− e
ρt
2 sinh( ξt2 )η
ξ
− e
ρt
2 sinh( ξt2 )η
ξ
1
2 e
ρt
2
(
cosh
(
ξt
2
)
+
(2(δ−η)+ρ) sinh( ξt2 )
ξ
)
 (40)
and
A0 =
2
xb − xa
∫ xb
xa
p0(x)dx An =
2
xb − xa
∫ xb
xa
p0(x) cos
(
2npi
[
x− xa
xb − xa
])
dx
B0 =
[
θeΘT21 − η(1− θ)eΘT11
η(1− θ)eΘT12 − θeΘT22
]
A0 Bn =
[
θeΘT21 − η(1− θ)eΘT11
η(1− θ)eΘT12 − θeΘT22
]
Ane
−d
(
2npi
xb−xa
)2
T
Propositions 6 and 7 determine explicitly the spatio-temporal dynamic path of the pollution level, px,t,
and the environmental tax, τx,t =
ux,t
px,t
, in local and global settings, respectively. However, the expressions in
(38) and (39) are particularly cumbersome and thus it is not possible to perform some comparative statics
exercises in order to understand how they depend on the different economic and environmental parameters.
Nevertheless, they allow to explicitly verify Proposition 1. Indeed, as shown in the following corollary, in the
absence of spatial heterogeneity in the initial distribution of pollution, the above dynamic paths representing
the global solution of our transboundary pollution control problem boil down to those found earlier in the
local solution.
Corollary 1. Suppose p0(x) = p0 for all x ∈ [xa, xb]. Then the globally optimal pair (px,t, ux,t) is given by[
px,t
ux,t
]
= p0e
Θt
[
1[
θeΘT21 −η(1−θ)eΘT11
η(1−θ)eΘT12 −θeΘT22
] ] (41)
where
eΘt =

1
2 e
ρt
2
(
cosh
(
ξt
2
)
− (2(δ−η)+ρ) sinh(
ξt
2 )
ξ
)
− e
ρt
2 sinh( ξt2 )η
ξ
− e
ρt
2 sinh( ξt2 )η
ξ
1
2 e
ρt
2
(
cosh
(
ξt
2
)
+
(2(δ−η)+ρ) sinh( ξt2 )
ξ
)
 . (42)
The globally optimal pair (px,t, ux,t) perfectly coincides with the locally optimal pair (px,t, ux,t).
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In order to better understand the extent to which the local and global solutions may differ, we can exploit
our closed-form solution from Propositions 6 and 7, along with Corollary 1, to visualize such an eventual
difference. Therefore, we now present some numerical example in which the parameters take the same values
employed by La Torre et al. (2017) in their calibration based on global CO2 data under an intermediate
degree of sustainability concern. Specifically, we set parameters as follows: η = 0.051, δ = 0.05, ρ = 0.04,
θ = 0.5, T = 30 and d = 0.01.
Figure 1: Spatio-temporal dynamics of the environmental tax (left) and pollution (right) with no spatial
heterogeneity in the initial pollution distribution. Local and global solutions perfectly coinciding.
We start by illustrating the pollution and environmental tax dynamics in a framework with no spatial
heterogeneity in the initial pollution distribution. Without loss of generality, we assume that p0(x) =
p0 = 400.23, representing today’s initial concentration of CO2 (400.23 parts per million in year 2015). From
Proposition 1 (and Corollary 1) we know that the local and global solutions will coincide, and these identical
solutions are shown in Figure 1 where we plot the spatio-temporal evolution of the environmental tax (left
panel) and pollution (right panel). Since in this setting transboundary pollution externalities do not play
any role every local economy behaves exactly in the same way, and optimality implies that the tax rate
initially exceeds its final level in order to effectively achieve a reduction in the stock of pollution.
We now move to the most interesting framework in which there is some spatial heterogeneity in the initial
pollution distribution. In order to characterize such heterogeneity we assume that p0(x) =
3
4p0 +
1
2p0e
−x2 ,
suggesting that on the average in the entire global economy the concentration of CO2 is roughly 400.23 parts
per million, with a peak in pollution concentration in the central local economies and lower concentrations
further away from the center. From Proposition 2 we know that global and local solutions do not coincide
and thus we will need to analyze them separately. This is shown in Figure 2 where we represent both the
local solution (top panel) and the global solution (bottom panel). The local solution implies a homogeneous
tax in every local economy (recall that the locally optimal tax rate in (14) is independent of the initial
pollution level) which however, due to the presence of transboundary pollution externalities not taken into
account by local policymakers, does not allow to reduce pollution in the global economy which instead
monotonically increases over time. The global solution yields a substantially different outcome: initially
the environmental tax is heterogeneous and on average higher that the local tax, and such a higher tax is
enough to allow pollution to monotonically fall within the global economy. The spatial heterogeneity in the
optimal tax is such that the tax is lower in the central local economies where pollution concentrations are
10
Figure 2: Spatio-temporal dynamics of the environmental tax (left) and pollution (right) with spatial het-
erogeneity in the initial pollution distribution. Local solution (top) and global solution (bottom) clearly not
coinciding.
higher than in the lateral ones in which pollution concentrations are lower. This kind of counterintuitive
result is due to the effect of transboundary pollution externalities which consists of homogenizing the spatial
distribution of pollution: provided that the tax is high enough to ensure a reduction of pollution, in the
central local economies pollution will tend to fall more rapidly than in lateral economies as a natural result
of diffusion, and as such environmental policy can be less stringent in such local economies. In other words,
from the global point of view of the social planner it is more effective to let diffusion do its work in the
central economy rather than imposing a higher tax rate: in a sense, the social planner internalizes both the
transboundary pollution externality and the physical mechanism of diffusion, allowing them to optimally
interact in order to minimize the social costs. As a final remark, note that both in the local and the global
solutions, at the end of the planning horizon pollution and as a result the environmental tax are spatially
homogenous: this is again due to the fact that diffusion acts as a convergence mechanism which tends to
smooth spatial differences out (Boucekkine et al., 2009; La Torre et al., 2015).
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4 Extensions
We now consider some extensions of our baseline model in order to show that our main results related to the
suboptimality of the local approach to the pollution problem still hold true even in more general settings.
4.1 Convex Functions
We first consider a setup in which the instantaneous loss function, the end-of-planning damage function and
the pollution accumulation functions are convex. Specifically, we assume that the instantaneous loss function
c(px,t, τx,t) is increasing and convex in both its arguments, that is cp > 0, cτ > 0, cpp > 0 and cττ > 0,
and that the end-of-planning damage function d(px,T ) is similarly increasing and convex in pollution, that
is d > 0 and dpp > 0. We also assume that pollution accumulation is determined by a function f(px,t, τx,t)
which is increasing in pollution and decreasing in the tax rate, fp > 0 and fτ < 0, but convex in both its
arguments, fpp ≥ 0 and fττ ≥ 0.
The social planner’s problem in a global context reads as follows:
min
τ(x,t)
C =
∫ T
0
∫ xb
xa
c(px,t, τx,t)e
−ρtdxdt+
1− θ
θ
∫ xb
xa
d(px,T )e
−ρTdx (43)
s.t.
∂px,t
∂t
= d
∂2px,t
∂x2
+ f(px,t, τx,t) (44)
∂τ(x, t)
∂x
=
∂p(x, t)
∂x
= 0, x ∈ {xa, xb}, (45)
px,0 > 0 given, (46)
from which the following FOCs follow:
cτ + λfτ = 0 (47)
∂λ
∂t
= ρλ− cp − λfp − d∂
2λ
∂x2
(48)
In a local context, instead, the social planned determines the environmental tax by solving the following
problem:
min
τt
C =
∫ T
0
c(pt, τt)e
−ρtdt+
1− θ
θ
d(pT )e
−ρT (49)
s.t. p˙t = f(pt, τt) (50)
p0 > 0 given, (51)
from which the following FOCs follow:
cτ + λfτ = 0 (52)
λ˙ = ρλ− cp − λfp (53)
which determines in a completely a-spatial manner the tax, τ∗t , which in turn drives the spatio-temporal
evolution of pollution as follows:
∂px,t
∂t
= d
∂2px,t
∂x2
+ f(px,t, τ
∗
t ). (54)
By comparing (47) - (48) with (52)- (53) , it is straightforward to conclude that the local solution is also
a global solution if and only if ∂
2λ
∂x2
= 0, that is the case whenever the initial pollution distribution is
homogeneous but not whenever this is heterogeneous. This suggests that Propositions 1 and 2 still hold true
independently of the specific functional forms assumed in the analysis.
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4.2 Capital Accumulation
We now consider a setting in which there is capital accumulation and so optimal saving. This framework
brings our analysis into a traditional macroeconomic context and as such we need to modify the objective
function in order to represent social welfare. Social welfare is the sum of two terms: the infinite discounted
sum of utilities and the end-of-planning horizon utility. The finite-time utility function u(cx,t, kx,t, τx,t, px,t)
where cx,t denotes consumption and kx,t capital, is assumed to be increasing in consumption and capital
but decreasing in the tax rate and pollution, and to be concave in all of its arguments. The end-of-planning
horizon utility v(kx,T , px,T ) is increasing in capital and decreasing in pollution and concave in both the
arguments. The accumulation of capital is determined by a function g(cx,t, kx,t, τx,t, px,t) which is increasing
in capital, decreasing in the remaining arguments, and concave in all of them. The accumulation of pollution
function f(kx,t, τx,t, px,t), other than the properties earlier discussed, is increasing and concave in capital.
Consistent with economic growth and environment literature (see Xepapadeas, 2005, for a survey), such a
framework allows us to consider mutual economic-environmental feedbacks: the stock of capital determines
the evolution of the pollution stock, which in turn affects the evolution of capital.
By assuming for the sake of simplicity that the diffusion parameter is the same for both capital and
pollution, the social planner’s problem in a global context reads as follows:
min
τ(x,t)
W =
∫ T
0
∫ xb
xa
u(cx,t, kx,t, τx,t, px,t)e
−ρtdxdt+
1− θ
θ
∫ xb
xa
v(kx,T , px,T )e
−ρTdx (55)
s.t.
∂px,t
∂t
= d
∂2px,t
∂x2
+ f(cx,t, kx,t, τx,t, px,t) (56)
∂kx,t
∂t
= d
∂2kx,t
∂x2
+ g(cx,t, kx,t, τx,t, px,t) (57)
∂τ(x, t)
∂x
=
∂p(x, t)
∂x
=
∂c(x, t)
∂x
=
∂k(x, t)
∂x
0, x ∈ {xa, xb}, (58)
px,0 > 0, kx,0 > 0 given, (59)
from which the following FOCs follow:
uc + λgc = 0 (60)
uτ + λgτ + ξfτ = 0 (61)
∂λ
∂t
= ρλ− uk − λgk − ξfk − dk ∂
2λ
∂x2
(62)
∂ξ
∂t
= ρξ − up − λgp − ξfp − d∂
2ξ
∂x2
(63)
In a local context, instead, the social planned determines the environmental tax and the level of consumption
by solving the following problem:
max
ct,τt
W =
∫ T
0
u(ct, kt, τt, pt)e
−ρtdt+
1− θ
θ
v(kT , pT )e
−ρT (64)
s.t. p˙t = f(kt, τt, pt) (65)
k˙t = g(ct, kt, τt, pt) (66)
p0 > 0, k0 > 0 given, (67)
from which the following FOCs follow:
uc + λgc = 0 (68)
uτ + λgτ + ξfτ = 0 (69)
λ˙ = ρλ− uk − λgk − ξfk (70)
ξ˙ = ρξ − up − λgp − ξfp, (71)
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and this determines in a completely a-spatial manner the tax, τ∗t , and consumption, c∗t , which in turn jointly
drive the spatio-temporal evolution of pollution and capital as follows:
∂px,t
∂t
= d
∂2px,t
∂x2
+ f(c∗t , kx,t, τ
∗
t , px,t) (72)
∂kx,t
∂t
= d
∂2kx,t
∂x2
+ g(c∗t , kx,t, τ
∗
t , px,t) (73)
By comparing (60) - (63) with (68) - (71), it is straightforward to conclude that the local solution is also
a global solution if and only if ∂
2λ
∂x2
= ∂
2ξ
∂x2
= 0, that is the case whenever the initial pollution and capital
distributions are homogeneous, but not whenever they are heterogeneous. This suggests that Propositions
1 and 2 still hold true independently of the fact that we introduce a richer macroeconomic framework with
mutual economic-environmental feedback effects in the analysis.
5 The Spatial Model: Unbounded Spatial Domain
We now consider a further extension of our baseline model, in which the spatial domain is no longer bounded
but rather unbounded. Different from what assumed earlier, now we assume that x ∈ R and thus there are no
natural borders for the global economy. Modeling the spatial domain as the whole real line implies that we are
considering an integrated global economy (i.e., the world economy, in which countries all interconnected one
another) in which pollution, even if generated in locations very apart one another, depends on the behavior
of all the different locations which compose it (i.e., the national countries within the world economy). In
our baseline setup with a bounded spatial domain the behavior of pollution at the borders plays a critical
role, and in particular the Neumann conditions guarantee that the endogenous patterns emerging from the
optimizing choices of the social planner are not induced by setting the pollution level at some arbitrary value
at the borders. In this sense, our extension to a unbounded spatial domain, in which natural borders do not
exist, removes this potential problem and allows us to consider the optimally determined pollution dynamics
without imposing any further restriction. In this setting the spatial control problem reads as follows:
min
ux,t
C =
∫ T
0
∫ +∞
−∞
p2x,t + u
2
x,t
2
e−ρtdxdt+
1− θ
θ
∫ +∞
−∞
p2x,T
2
e−ρTdx (74)
s.t.
∂px,t
∂t
= d
∂2px,t
∂x2
+ (η − δ) px,t − ηux,t on (−∞,+∞)× (0, T ) (75)
px,0 > 0 in (−∞,+∞) (76)
Most of the calculations presented in section 3 apply in this case as well, and it is possible to show that the
following system of PDEs:
∂px,t
∂t
= d
∂2px,t
∂x2
+ (η − δ) px,t − ηux,t (77)
∂ux,t
∂t
= ρux,t − d∂
2ux,t
∂x2
− ηpx,t − (η − δ)ux,t, (78)
jointly with the following boundary conditions:
px,0 = p0(x) (79)
ux,T = η
1− θ
θ
px,T (80)
characterize the optimal solution of our spatial control problem. It is straightforward to note that the
presence of d
∂2ux,t
∂x2
places eventually a wedge between the local and the global solution. Therefore, exactly
the same results as in Propositions 1 and 2 hold: in the case in which the initial pollution distribution is
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homogeneous the local solution coincides with the global one, while in the case in which the initial pollution
distribution is heterogeneous the local and the global solutions differ with the local solution being suboptimal.
This suggests that our conclusions regarding the desirability of a global approach to environmental problems,
consistently with the think globally, act locally motto, are independent of the specific assumptions on the
structure of the spatial domain.
Moreover, by applying the same arguments employed in Propositions 4 and 5, it is possible to prove the
following result.
Proposition 8. Let (ux,t, px,t) ≥ 0 be the globally optimal solution of the spatial optimal control problem (74)
– (76) with initial pollution level given by p0(x). Let ux,t = px,tτx,t, and τmin = min(x,t)∈(−∞,+∞)×[0,T ] τx,t;
then px,t ≤ e(η−δ−ητmin)thx,t where hx,t is the solution of the following problem:
∂hx,t
∂t
= d
∂2hx,t
∂x2
on (−∞,+∞)× (0, T ) (81)
hx,0 = p0(x) in (−∞,+∞) (82)
where hx,t is then the well-known classical solution of the heat equation over an unbounded domain provided
by means of the Green functions as follows:
hx,t =
1
2
√
pidt
∫ +∞
−∞
e−
(x−y)2
4dt p0(y)dy.
Moreover, if τmin >
η−δ
η then limT→+∞ px,T = 0 for any x ∈ R.
Consistent with what discussed in our baseline model, Proposition 8 states that the minimum of the
tax rate in different local economies at different moments in time, τmin, determines an upper bound for
the pollution stock in each locations, and if such a minimum of the tax is large enough (i.e., τmin >
η−δ
η )
then each location within the global economy will achieve a completely pollution-free status in the long run.
This allows us to quantify the minimal level of policy intervention required to achieve the desirable goal of
pollution elimination in the global economy and such a minimal level of collaboration across local economies
perfectly coincide with that determined in our baseline model, suggesting that also our conclusion regarding
the amount of collaboration needed to reduce global pollution is independent of the specific assumptions on
the structure of the spatial domain.
5.1 An Analytical Solution
Even in the presence of an unbounded spatial domain, given the specific linear-quadratic structure of our
model (74) - (76), it is possible to solve it in closed form to gain some further understanding on the difference
between the local and the global solutions. This result is summarized in the next two propositions.
Proposition 9. The locally optimal pair (px,t, ux,t) is given by[
px,t
ux,t
]
=
[
1
2
√
pidt
e
∫ t
0 η−δ−ητ∗s ds
∫ +∞
−∞ e
− (x−y)2
4dt p0(y)dy
τ∗t px,t
]
, (83)
where τ∗t is given by (14).
Proposition 10. The globally optimal pair (px,t, ux,t) is given by
[
px,t
ux,t
]
= eΘt
 12√pidt
∫ +∞
−∞ e
− (x−y)2
4dt p0(y)dy
1
2
√
pid(T−t)
∫ +∞
−∞ e
− (x−y)2
4d(T−t) z˜1y,Tdy
 (84)
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where
z˜1x,T =
1
2
√
pidT
[
θeΘT21 − η(1− θ)eΘT11
η(1− θ)eΘT12 − θeΘT22
] ∫ +∞
−∞
e−
(x−y)2
4dT p0(y)dy
and
eΘt =

1
2 e
ρt
2
(
cosh
(
ξt
2
)
− (2(δ−η)+ρ) sinh(
ξt
2 )
ξ
)
− e
ρt
2 sinh( ξt2 )η
ξ
− e
ρt
2 sinh( ξt2 )η
ξ
1
2 e
ρt
2
(
cosh
(
ξt
2
)
+
(2(δ−η)+ρ) sinh( ξt2 )
ξ
)
 (85)
Propositions 9 and 10 determine explicitly the spatio-temporal dynamic path of the pollution level,
px,t, and the environmental tax, τx,t =
ux,t
px,t
, in local and global settings, respectively. The same comments
presented for the closed-form solution of our baseline model apply: the expressions in (83) and (84) are
so cumbersome to prevent the possibility to understand how they depend on the different economic and
environmental parameters. Note that the closed-form expression for the dynamic path of the environmental
rate and the pollution level in Propositions 9 and 10 can be expressed in a simpler form by interpreting it as
the expected value of a random variable. More precisely, recall that if Z is a standard normal distribution,
its density is given by:
fZ(x) =
1√
2pi
e−
z2
2
and the expected value of the composition g(Z), where g : R→ R is a real function, is given by
E[g(Z)] =
∫ +∞
−∞
g(s)fZ(s)ds
By introducing the change of variable z = y−x√
2dt
and replacing dy =
√
2dtdz, (px,t, ux,t) in (83) can be
rewritten as follows:[
px,t
ux,t
]
=
[
1
2
√
pidt
e
∫ t
0 η−δ−ητ∗s ds
∫ +∞
−∞ e
− (x−y)2
4dt p0(y)dy
τ∗t px,t
]
=
[
e
∫ t
0 η−δ−ητ∗s dsEp0(x+ 2
√
dtZ)
τ∗t px,t
]
, (86)
while substituting in (84) leads to the following:
[
px,t
ux,t
]
= eΘt
 1√2pi
∫ +∞
−∞ e
− z2
2 p0(x+ z
√
2dt)dz
1
2
√
pid(T−t)
∫ +∞
−∞ e
− (x−y)2
4d(T−t) z˜1y,Tdy
 = eΘt [ Ep0(x+√2dtZ))Ez˜1(x+√2d(T − t)Z, T ))
]
(87)
where
z˜1x,T = z˜
1(x, T ) =
[
θeΘT21 − η(1− θ)eΘT11
η(1− θ)eΘT12 − θeΘT22
]
Ep0(x+
√
2dTZ))
The above stochastic formulations in terms of the expected value of a rescaled normal distribution allows
to express the closed-form solutions in local and global settings in a more compact form and to use a Monte-
Carlo simulations to approximate the optimal paths in our following numerical example. From an economic
perspective, the pollution expression states that, as expected, in the long-run the level of pollution in a single
location x will get more and more affected by pollution externalities over time. Despite the difficulties in
interpreting the spatio-temporal dynamic path of the pollution level and the environmental tax, Propositions
9 and 10 allow to explicitly verify Proposition 1. Indeed, as shown in the following corollary, in the absence
of spatial heterogeneity in the initial distribution of pollution, the globally optimal dynamic path of our
transboundary pollution control problem boils down to the locally optimal one.
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Corollary 2. Suppose that p0(x) = p0 for all x ∈ (−∞,+∞). The globally optimal pair (px,t, ux,t) is given
by [
px,t
ux,t
]
= p0e
Θt
[
1[
θeΘT21 −η(1−θ)eΘT11
η(1−θ)eΘT12 −θeΘT22
] ]
where
eΘt =

1
2 e
ρt
2
(
cosh
(
ξt
2
)
− (2(δ−η)+ρ) sinh(
ξt
2 )
ξ
)
− e
ρt
2 sinh( ξt2 )η
ξ
− e
ρt
2 sinh( ξt2 )η
ξ
1
2 e
ρt
2
(
cosh
(
ξt
2
)
+
(2(δ−η)+ρ) sinh( ξt2 )
ξ
)
 . (88)
The globally optimal pair (px,t, ux,t) perfectly coincides with the locally optimal pair (px,t, ux,t).
In order to better understand the extent to which the local and global solutions may differ, we can exploit
our closed-form solution from Propositions 9 and 10 to visualize such an eventual difference. Therefore, we
now present some numerical example based on the same parameter values employed in our baseline model,
by focusing only on the most interesting case in which the initial pollution distribution is heterogeneous,
namely p0(x) =
3
4p0 +
1
2p0e
−x2 with x ∈ R (while in our baseline model x ∈ [−1, 1]). This is illustrated in
Figure 3 where we represent both the local solution (top panel) and the global solution (bottom panel) in
the spatial interval [-1, 1], that is a small subset of the entire spatial domain. Exactly as in our baseline
model, in which the spatial domain is bounded, the local and global solutions yield completely different
outcomes. The local solution implies a homogeneous tax in every local economy which however is not high
enough to reduce pollution in the global economy. The pollution dynamics is non-monotonic as it initially
decreases and then increases. Also the global solution implies a spatially homogeneous tax but this is
initially higher than in the local solution, and such a higher tax is enough to yield a monotonic reduction in
pollution within the global economy. The main difference with respect to the bounded spatial domain case
is associated with the initial spatial structure of the environmental tax: this is heterogeneous in the bounded
case and homogeneous in the unbounded case, and this is due to the role of diffusion, which per se tends to
reduce pollution everywhere in the spatial interval considered and as such there is no need for the optimal
tax to be space-dependent. On average the tax is higher in the unbounded than in the bounded case but
nevertheless this does not lead to a lower pollution level at the end of the planning horizon, which turns
out to be higher in the unbounded than in the bounded case: this is due to the initial stock of pollution
which is overall larger in the unbounded that in the bounded case, since pollution concentrations are strictly
positive on the whole real axis in the unbounded case while they are irrelevant outside the interval [-1,1]
in the bounded case (since pollution flows stop at the border). The higher initial stock of pollution in the
unbounded case requires thus a higher environmental tax on average but, despite pollution tends to smooth
spatial differences out by reducing pollution concentrations in the local economies where it is relatively more
abundant and increasing them in those in which it is relatively more scarse, this is not enough to offset the
difference in the initial stock of pollution which remains higher in the unbounded than in the bounded case
even at the end of the planning horizon.
5.2 Extensions
By following exactly the same arguments presented earlier in the bounded spatial domain case, it is straight-
forward to show that the results of Propositions 1 and 2 apply also in more general settings than the specific
one just discussed. In particular, even in an unbounded spatial domain framework, by allowing the instan-
taneous loss function, the end-of-planning damage function and the pollution accumulation functions to be
convex, the FOCs in the local and global cases will be given by (52)- (53) and (47) - (48), respectively. By
introducing capital accumulation and optimal consumption, along the lines discussed in section 4, the FOCs
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Figure 3: Spatio-temporal dynamics of the environmental tax (left) and pollution (right) with spatial het-
erogeneity in the initial pollution distribution. Local solution (top) and global solution (bottom) clearly not
coinciding.
in the local and global cases will be given by (68) - (71) and (60) - (63), respectively. Therefore, exactly the
same comments we highlighted earlier hold true, confirming that the suboptimality of the local approach
to the pollution problem still applies in general settings and independently of the specific structure of the
spatial domain.
6 Conclusion
Environmental policy is essential in order to achieve sustainable development but understanding the optimal
level of policy intervention is not simple, especially because of the presence of transboundary externalities.
The popular motto think globally, act locally summarizes the view that policy coordination across individual
policymakers is necessary to preserve our common environment. In this paper we try to formally analyze
whether this is really the case by focusing on a pollution control problem over a finite horizon and in a
spatial framework. This setting gives rise to a regional optimal control problem which allows us to compare
the local and global solutions in which, respectively, the transboundary externality is and is not taken into
account in the determination of the optimal policy by individual local policymakers. We show that whenever
the initial spatial distribution of pollution is homogeneous then the local and the global solutions coincide,
while whenever this is heterogeneous the two solutions differ meaning that the local solution is suboptimal.
In this latter context, which represents the most realistic from a real world perspective, coordination across
local policymakers is the best approach consistently with the think globally, act locally argument. We also
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quantify the minimal level of policy intervention that needs to be implemented locally in order to achieve
the globally desirable goal of pollution elimination. Indeed, we show that whenever every local economy
implements an environmental policy stringent enough, then the global pollution level will fall and over the
long run the entire global economy will be able to achieve a completely pollution-free status. We also show
that our main conclusions do not depend on the peculiarity of our model’s formulation but they rather
extend to more general and complicated frameworks.
To the best of our knowledge, no other paper has explicitly analyzed a regional optimal control problem in
economics nor the potential differences between local and global solutions arising from an economic problem
in spatial settings in a way comparable to ours. The approach has therefore been a bit simplistic and the
analysis could be extended along multiple directions. Some further heterogeneity in the characteristics or
the objectives of local policymakers can be introduced in order to represent the realistic situation in which
some local economies (due for example to binding budget constraints) in the entire global economy cannot
optimally determine their level of intervention. This further issue is left for future research.
A Technical Appendix
In this section we present all the proofs of the results discussed in the paper.
Proof of Proposition 1
The proof is trivial and it follows by noticing that the pair (u, p) solves equations (28) and (29), since
∂2px,t
∂x2
= 0, and it satisfies the boundary conditions (30)-(33).
Proof of Proposition 2
The proof is trivial and it follows by noticing that the pair (u, p) does not solve equations (28) and (29)
because ∂
2p0(x)
∂x2
6= 0.
Proof of Proposition 3
As (u, p) is optimal, then the following inequality is true:
∂px,t
∂t
≤ ∂
2px,t
∂x2
+ (η − δ − ητmin)px,t (89)
By integrating from xa to xb we obtain:
d
dt
∫ xb
xa
px,tdx ≤
∫ xb
xa
∂2px,t
∂x2
+ (η − δ − ητmin)
∫ xb
xa
px,tdx, (90)
which implies:
d
dt
ptott ≤ (η − δ − ητmin)ptott ≤ 0, (91)
and then the thesis follows.
Proof of Proposition 4
The following proposition will be instrumental to proving Proposition 4.
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Proposition 11. (Friedman, 2008) Let ρ be smooth and suppose that:
∂ρ
∂t
− d∂
2ρ
∂x2
≥ −cρ in (xa, xb)× (0, T ) (92)
∂ρ
∂n
≥ 0, on {xa, xb} × (0, T ) (93)
ρ(0, x) ≥ 0 in (xa, xb) (94)
where d is a positive real number and c ∈ R. Then ρ ≥ 0 in (xa, xb)× (0, T ).
From the above proposition it is now straightforward to prove our thesis. Let p¯x,t be a solution to the
following problem:
∂px,t
∂t
= d
∂2px,t
∂x2
+ (η − δ − ητmin)px,t (95)
px,0 = p0(x) (96)
∂pxa,t
∂x
=
∂pxb,t
∂x
= 0 ∀t ∈ [0, T ] (97)
Let us define ρx,t = p¯x,t − px,t. By computing the equation for ρ, we get:
∂ρx,t
∂t
≥ d∂
2ρx,t
∂x2
+ (η − δ − ητmin)ρx,t (98)
ρx,t = 0 (99)
∂ρxa,t
∂x
=
∂ρxb,t
∂x
= 0 ∀t ∈ [0, T ] (100)
From the above result Proposition 11, we can deduce that ρ ≥ 0 and then px,t ≤ p¯x,t. On the other hand,
by using a simple change of variable it is easy to show that if p¯ solves the above problem given by (95) -
(97), then p¯ can be written as follows:
p¯x,t = e
(η−δ−ητmin)thx,t (101)
where hx,t is the well-known classical solution of the heat equation with Neumann boundary conditions,
given by the following expression:
hx,t =
∑
n≥0
Bne
−d
(
npi
xb−xa
)2
t
cos
[
npi(x− xa)
xb − xa
]
(102)
where:
B0 =
1
xb − xa
∫ xb
xa
p0(x)dx (103)
and:
Bn =
2
xb − xa
∫ xb
xa
p0(x) cos
[
npi(x− xa)
xb − xa
]
dx (104)
Proof of Proposition 5
The proposition follows as a corollary of Proposition 4 which states that px,t ≤ e(η−δ−ητmin)thx,t. If τmin >
η−δ
η , for any x ∈ [xa, xb] it is straightforward to conclude the following:
lim
T→∞
px,T ≤ lim
T→∞
e(η−δ−ητmin)Thx,T = 0. (105)
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Proof of Proposition 6
To determine the closed-form local solution for the pollution level, let us plug the expression ux,t = τ
∗
t px,t
into the equation for p which then boils down to
∂px,t
∂t
= d
∂2px,t
∂x2
+ (η − δ) px,t − ητ∗t px,t (106)
The evolution of px,t is given by
px,t = e
∫ t
0 η−δ−ητ∗s dshx,t (107)
where hx,t is the solution to the classical heat equation
∂hx,t
∂t
= d
∂2hx,t
∂x2
(108)
subject to the conditions:
∂hx,t
∂x
= 0, x ∈ {xa, xb}, (109)
px,0 > 0 given. (110)
Therefore, the solution p is given by
px,t = e
∫ t
0 η−δ−ητ∗s ds
A0
2
+
∑
n≥1
An cos
(
2npi
[
x− xa
xb − xa
]) (111)
where
A0 =
2
xb − xa
∫ xb
xa
p0(x)dx, An =
2
xb − xa
∫ xb
xa
p0(x) cos
(
2npi
[
x− xa
xb − xa
])
dx (112)
Proof of Proposition 7
By defining the vector-value variable zx,t and the matrix Θ as for the one dimensional case,
zx,t =
[
px,t
ux,t
]
, Θ =
[
η − δ −η
−η ρ− η + δ
]
and the diffusion matrix D as follows
D =
(
d 0
0 −d
)
and the system can be written in a more compact form as
∂zx,t
∂t
= D
∂2zx,t
∂x2
+ Θzx,t
This is a system of two heat equations. By using the change of variable z˜x,t = e
−Θtzx,t it is easy to show
that the solution to this equation takes the following form:
zx,t = e
Θtz˜x,t
where
eΘt =

1
2 e
ρt
2
(
cosh
(
ξt
2
)
− (2(δ−η)+ρ) sinh(
ξt
2 )
ξ
)
− e
ρt
2 sinh( ξt2 )η
ξ
− e
ρt
2 sinh( ξt2 )η
ξ
1
2 e
ρt
2
(
cosh
(
ξt
2
)
+
(2(δ−η)+ρ) sinh( ξt2 )
ξ
)
 (113)
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and
z˜x,t =
 A02 +∑n≥1Ane−d
(
2npi
xb−xa
)2
t
cos
(
2npi
[
x−xa
xb−xa
])
B0
2 +
∑
n≥1Bne
−d
(
2npi
xb−xa
)2
(T−t)
cos
(
2npi
[
x−xa
xb−xa
])

If we plug t = 0 we get that eΘ0 = I and then the first component of z boils down to
z˜0x,0 = p0(x) =
A0
2
+
∑
n≥1
An cos
(
2npi
[
x− xa
xb − xa
])
which implies that A0 and An are the Fourier coefficients of p0, that is
A0 =
2
xb − xa
∫ xb
xa
p0(x)dx
and
An =
2
xb − xa
∫ xb
xa
p0(x) cos
(
2npi
[
x− xa
xb − xa
])
dx
For the terminal condition, instead, let us plug t = T into the expression of zx,t. We get
zx,T = e
ΘT
[
z˜0x,T
z˜1x,T
]
= eΘT
 A02 +∑n≥1Ane−d
(
2npi
xb−xa
)2
T
cos
(
2npi
[
x−xa
xb−xa
])
B0
2 +
∑
n≥1Bn cos
(
2npi
[
x−xa
xb−xa
])

and by using the terminal condition
ux,T = η
1− θ
θ
px,T
we get the system
θ
η(1− θ) =
eΘT11 (
A0
2 +
∑
n≥1Ane
−d
(
2npi
xb−xa
)2
T
cos
(
2npi
[
x−xa
xb−xa
])
) + eΘT12 (
B0
2 +
∑
n≥1Bn cos
(
2npi
[
x−xa
xb−xa
])
)
eΘT21 (
A0
2 +
∑
n≥1Ane
−d
(
2npi
xb−xa
)2
T
cos
(
2npi
[
x−xa
xb−xa
])
) + eΘT22 (
B0
2 +
∑
n≥1Bn cos
(
2npi
[
x−xa
xb−xa
])
)
which can be transformed into
θ
η(1− θ) =
eΘT11
A0
2 + e
ΘT
12
B0
2 +
∑
n≥1
(
eΘT11 Ane
−d
(
2npi
xb−xa
)2
T
+ eΘT12 Bn
)
cos
(
2npi
[
x−xa
xb−xa
])
eΘT21
A0
2 + e
ΘT
22
B0
2 +
∑
n≥1
(
eΘT21 Ane
−d
(
2npi
xb−xa
)2
T
+ eΘT22 Bn
)
cos
(
2npi
[
x−xa
xb−xa
])
and then
θ
eΘT21 A02 + eΘT22 B02 +∑
n≥1
(
eΘT21 Ane
−d
(
2npi
xb−xa
)2
T
+ eΘT22 Bn
)
cos
(
2npi
[
x− xa
xb − xa
]) =
η(1− θ)
eΘT11 A02 + eΘT12 B02 +∑
n≥1
(
eΘT11 Ane
−d
(
2npi
xb−xa
)2
T
+ eΘT12 Bn
)
cos
(
2npi
[
x− xa
xb − xa
])
and then
θ
(
eΘT21
A0
2
+ eΘT22
B0
2
)
= η(1− θ)
(
eΘT11
A0
2
+ eΘT12
B0
2
)
(θeΘT21 − η(1− θ)eΘT11 )
A0
2
= (η(1− θ)eΘT12 − θeΘT22 )
B0
2
22
B0 =
[
θeΘT21 − η(1− θ)eΘT11
η(1− θ)eΘT12 − θeΘT22
]
A0
(θeΘT21 − η(1− θ)eΘT11 )Ane−d
(
npi
xb−xa
)2
T
= η(1− θ)eΘT12 Bn − θeΘT22 Bn
(θeΘT21 − η(1− θ)eΘT11 )Ane−d
(
npi
xb−xa
)2
T
= (η(1− θ)eΘT12 − θeΘT22 )Bn
Bn =
[
θeΘT21 − η(1− θ)eΘT11
η(1− θ)eΘT12 − θeΘT22
]
Ane
−d
(
2npi
xb−xa
)2
T
Proof of Proposition 9
A local solution is a pair (ux,t, px,t) where ux,t = τ
∗
t px,t and τ
∗
t is given in (14). To determine the evolution
of p, let us proceed as in the bounded case and plug the expression ux,t = τ
∗
t px,t into the equation for p
which then boils down to
∂px,t
∂t
= d
∂2px,t
∂x2
+ (η − δ) px,t − ητ∗t px,t (114)
The evolution of px,t is given by
px,t = e
∫ t
0 η−δ−ητ∗s dshx,t (115)
where hx,t is the solution to the classical heat equation
∂hx,t
∂t
= d
∂2hx,t
∂x2
(116)
subject to the initial condition hx,0 = px,0 > 0. By combining these results we get that p is given by
px,t =
1
2
√
pidt
e
∫ t
0 η−δ−ητ∗s ds
∫ +∞
−∞
e−
(x−y)2
4dt p0(y)dy (117)
Proof of Proposition 10
By repeating the same steps as in the baseline model, the system can be written in a more compact form as
∂zx,t
∂t
= D
∂2zx,t
∂x2
+ Θzx,t
and by introducing the change of variable z˜ = e−Θtz it is easy to show that the solution to this equation
takes the following form:
zx,t = e
Θtz˜x,t.
Now the first component of z˜, z˜0x,t, solves the following heat equation
∂z˜0x,t
∂t
= d
∂2z˜0x,t
∂x2
with initial condition z0x,0 = p0(x). The solution is then provided by means of the Green functions as follows:
z˜0x,t =
1
2
√
pidt
∫ +∞
−∞
e−
(x−y)2
4dt p0(y)dy
The second component of z˜, z˜1x,t, satisfies the following backward heat equation
∂z˜1x,t
∂t
= −d∂
2z˜1x,t
∂x2
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and the solution is then provided by means of the Green functions as follows:
z˜1x,t =
1
2
√
pid(T − t)
∫ +∞
−∞
e
− (x−y)2
4d(T−t) z˜1y,Tdy
Using the terminal condition for u and p, we get
θ
η(1− θ) =
px,T
ux,T
=
eΘT11 z˜
0
x,T + e
ΘT
12 z˜
1
x,T
eΘT21 z˜
0
x,T + e
ΘT
22 z˜
1
x,T
which implies that
θeΘT21 z˜
0
x,T + θe
ΘT
22 z˜
1
x,T = η(1− θ)eΘT11 z˜0x,T + η(1− θ)eΘT12 z˜1x,T
(θeΘT21 − η(1− θ)eΘT11 )z˜0x,T = (η(1− θ)eΘT12 − θeΘT22 )z˜1x,T
and, finally,
z˜1x,T =
[
θeΘT21 − η(1− θ)eΘT11
η(1− θ)eΘT12 − θeΘT22
]
z˜0x,T
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